C2 in Mountain Warfare

A long held military truism is about commanding the high ground in any fight: often regarded as a precursor to victory. In the days of digital evangelism, much is made of this tenet in a metaphorical sense: there are claims that controlling the digital high ground will guarantee success. But warfare continues to require operating and fighting in physical terrain. In recent conflicts, few forces have been able to avoid fighting in mountains: the prevailing forces usually exploit mountains as the literal high ground. In the Kargil War, Nagorno-Karabakh, Kashmir, Afghanistan, and in Ukraine, as well as in resistance operations by the Kurds, mountain warfare has been a significant feature in fighting.

Mountain warfare involves mobility (skiing, snowshoeing, dogs, mules, sledges, et al), mountaineering (ascending, roped or free climbing, traverses, rappelling, etc), cold weather survival (including avalanche preparation), and operating at height. It is also warfare: the requirements are not simply surviving and operating in cold weather or high environments but to contest, challenge, and fight in these conditions. Warfare in such environments cannot simply be bases and patrols, they do (and will continue to) entail combat operations.

There are similarities between mountain warfare and cold weather warfare – the physical and mental resilience required are certainly similar – but the equipment, the skill, and the challenges for commanders differ considerably. Note the Finnish experience in trying to operate in the terrain of Norway over the past decade: Cold weather knowledge, understanding and experience were present yet the ability to climb and survive in mountainous terrain were not. Movement through snow and across glacial landscapes would be familiar to many (for example), but the skills needed to climb thousands of feet in elevation – on rock and ice – were not. US military forces are familiar with cold weather skills; from Alaska to the Arctic, US Army units operate in extreme temperatures. Yet the skills required to operate in mountains are not a feature of regular training. The challenges are varied. Mountains create their own climate ecosystems, oxygen is in shorter supply at altitude, and the geography requires different approaches, itself imposing costs on time and energy.

The promise of technology to solve these problems does a disservice to the reality of living and working in such hostile terrain. Command and control in mountains presents different challenges that are not easily unpicked by the application of digital technologies or artificial intelligence. Despite the promises of software companies, the realities of terrain and weather challenge even the most digitally advanced force. Having the doctrine, training, equipment, and infrastructure necessary to deliver competent troops into a mountain environment is useful; having troops who work in these conditions can be battle-winning.

The history of the US 10^th Mountain Division illustrates this case well. In 1944, during their first CPX – and after nearly four years of training the regiments under them – the staff (mostly all climbers, skiers, and backwoodsmen in civilian life), finally understood the issues around combined arms fighting and logistics requirements in hostile terrain, geography, and climates. Artillery trajectories, time of flights, how to prepare supplies, and what actually worked in getting resupply to troops differed from expectations (for example, everyone learned rapidly that mules would not move once snow reached their bellies). Lessons such as these had to be relearned over different periods: the USMC directive to prepare to defend Norway from 1978 changed the way they trained, equipped and operated in a fundamental way. The US Army was not successful in operating (and denying) mountain terrain to insurgents in Afghanistan from 2002 onwards, something the Turkish have continued to find challenging against the Kurds, even with a prolific use of drones.

C2 in mountain and cold weather warfare is also different. A commander who knows how to operate there, what his forces need, and how they can deliver success are all key factors determining outcomes. Staffs must be comfortable with the ambiguity that is a feature of mountain warfare: not only are battle lines unclear but connectivity is patchy and unreliable. Aviation assets have less capability at height. Resupply takes longer. Small detachments can have disproportionate impacts – but only if employed correctly and by a skilled commander. Concealment, surprise, and deception have different characteristics in these terrains: a savvy commander can exploit these if they have the courage and the confidence in their troops. Standard infantry C2 will not work well in such environments. It may even require different commanders; it surely will need staffs who are less beholden to process and more open to bottom-up driven reality checks, as well as less top-down command compliance.

In military C2, one size does not fit all: the application of MDO doctrine to such environments will look good on paper but there are few examples of where it has been tested and not found wanting. The limitations of electrical power at altitude and in extreme temperatures is only one problem. The real question is how much the shift that MDO is promoting in command philosophy (from delegated execution to detailed direction) will inhibit success on operations that depend on it.

The history of human conflict does indeed demonstrate the advantages in controlling the high ground. The literal high ground. The realities of mountain and cold weather warfare – and the C2 element of that – cannot be escaped. Which is why so many states retain trained, equipped, and specialist formations to perform this task. They are not simply specialist light infantry: they offer skills that enable success in the extreme terrains.

For more on this topic, suggested reading might start with Lance Blyth’s, Ski, Climb, Fight: The 10^th Mountain Division and the Rise of Mountain Warfare.