C2 Systems for PK Missions

European states considering sending a force to Ukraine as part of a peace keeping (PK) mission are – rightly – working on the details of the combat power and thus the credibility of the force they are deploying.  Western militaries are used to working within ‘coalitions of the willing’: The US has been constructing and running similar coalitions for decades around the world for a variety of missions – from counter piracy operations to counter narcotics ones. The UN has also been running PK missions since the 1947. This is a well-trodden path and there is a long list of protocols, procedures, lessons identified, and useful experience within the community. Harnessing these and applying them to the context of Ukraine – and the wording of the mission – will be vital.

While Western military experience of PK operations might not be widespread, an important factor in putting a force together will be in its command and control. ‘Who’ commands the force is likely to be a political fight rather than selecting the best person for the job. How they command is more important. This reference to ‘how’ is just not about the culture or philosophy adopted but – as important – about the tools required to ensure the passage of orders, plans and situational awareness.

The C2 systems used by most European states are based around a core NATO IT system; either the exact system or one interoperable with it. However, the restrictions that the US seems likely to impose over the potential mission to Ukraine mean that NATO systems are unlikely to be authorised or supported. This is not without precedent. In missions involving non-NATO states, coalitions of the willing have often employed bespoke systems.

Historically, where the US has provided the ‘framework’ nation for these missions, the US Department of Defence (DoD) has provided a standalone Coalition Information Sharing Networks (known as CENTRIX). At its core, this C2 system provides connectivity for commanders and their forces across multiple security classifications. In the Middle East, variants have included CENTRIX GCTF (Global Counter Terrorism Task Force), CENTRIX MCFI (Multinational Coalition Forces – Iraq), CENTRIX ISAF (International Security Assistance Forces Afghanistan) and CFE (CENTRIX Four Eyes) to name but four. There are also a variety of other versions in use around the world, some on a bilateral basis, all underwritten by the US DoD.

Without the ability to use a CENTRIX derivative or a NATO C2 system, any PK mission to Ukraine will need to find a different pathway for command-and-control processes, orders and reporting. There are a variety of systems off-the-shelf, including the system that the Ukrainian military is already using. Yet that one, much like many of the commercial offerings, might also be subject to the vagaries of US political and policy decisions. If the Ukrainian PK mission is to be truly independent of the US, the options are reduced considerably.

The requirements need to allow multi-level security access to a variety of partner states and their militaries – including Ukraine, as well as some other non-European states that may choose to participate and send forces. It also needs to be able to work across other national combat systems, meaning that military forces can continue to use their own tactical comms systems without making a wholesale change to something new, with the associated costs that such a change would entail. The selected system will also need to be secure, scalable, cloud compliant, to function in hotly contested EW environments, and be well protected from cyber attacks. There will be a myriad of other requirements too which might feel to ‘Cold-War-Warriors’ like an impossible set of needs.

But the technology, systems, processes and ability to interoperate have come a long way over the past 40 years. Requirements that may have been deemed exceptionally complex before are now distinctly possible; indeed, modern C2 systems have these requirements built in. There are systems that do not simply work across various national and international military organisations but also allow for seamless information exchange with civilian and government agencies too – all with the security and resilience of a national security system.

Ideally, the C2 system of choice should be one that is familiar to operators and users. Commercial options do exist that fill this need but that are not dependent on US providers. Selecting the right one and putting that solution in place well before any PK mission is agreed, would be a significant step forward. It would also demonstrate that the Reassurance force for Ukraine is more than a paper tiger.