Decoupling Realistically starts with C2 and data

There is no doubt that the realities of many states in Europe have changed irreversibly by the actions of President Donald Trump’s second term in office. Gone are the days where the US was the guarantor for security and freedoms, the ambition now is to make Europe self-sufficient in national security terms. Successive French presidents have called on European strategic autonomy, a goal that has been mired in the reality of political differences and the demands of domestic politics in European states. But now the language in European capitals has changed: European self-sufficiency – in security if nothing else – is now a burgeoning requirement. However, what many politicians also seem to understand is that this cannot happen overnight. Achieving some semblance of serious autonomy in deterrence will require at least a decade of dedicated political will and funding. The latter might exist already, with promises of funding to be delivered across the next decade. But the gap between now and when this ambition might be realised also requires some clear-headed thinking. Decoupling from US dependencies and supply chains cannot happen overnight.

Whilst armament companies build factories and train workers, managers, and control engineers, militaries must learn to simplify and harmonise requirements. Raw materials, strategic reserves, and rare earth access need to be developed and protected; armouries and war stocks reconstructed; all while continuing to support and supply Ukraine’s on-going war against Russia and protecting their own individual societies from growing levels of Moscow’s aggression. The industrial challenges are enormous and often misunderstood by politicians and military chiefs: but they are also misconstrued by industry leaders – particularly in terms of promising timelines that are undeliverable, and system performance that will not match the sales pitch. While this works itself out – and it can – US supplies, arms, expertise, platforms, and people will continue to form the backbone of European military forces. Not only is this realistic, it is also necessary to provide even the semblance of a deterrence posture against Russian revanchism. We should not be punishing European politicians for continuing to fete President Trump, or US military leaders. Neither should we be unrealistic about what US platforms deliver: proven, tested, and superior equipment that Europe cannot produce (yet) in sufficient quality, quantity, breadth, or with the reliability that US firms can deliver.

It would be foolish not to recognise that American products also have issues: not least in the numbers now being demanded. As each new order for, say, Patriot missiles is made, someone else has to accept a delay in their own delivery. Only so many are made each year, and demand exceeds supply (even with the substantial increase in numbers that have been promised out of the factory door). The same is true for artillery ammunition, tanks, F35s, drones, and computer chips. And there is also the reality that any order for the US military will be prioritised ahead of any requirement from other customers, even close allies (something that the Australian Defence Force, and the AUKUS partnership is having to deal with now).

Cognisant of all those factors, the graduated decoupling of European militaries from US suppliers is underway is a fact. It might not be evident for 5 years, but the shift of military suppliers after 2030 is going to become rapidly evident in fielded forces.

There are areas that European states can and should be taking now, however. Whilst the US is prioritising its own requirements in C2 terms, Europe must look at their own alternative systems and make decisions that will future proof the decoupling that will take place. Relying on US systems that can be ‘turned off’, eavesdropped on, exploited, and manipulated by a foreign power should not be considered sound decision-making: continuing to be dependent on such systems is a danger to national security, one which the US would not condone for itself. Whilst tech giants might make arguments about their tax-basing, supra-national status, culture, and values, they are governed by US interests more than those of any European state. Data ownership, data processing, and data storage must be one of the first transitions that European states make in the move away from US dependencies. No longer can contracts with US tech giants be considered wise and safe investments. Where the US is choosing on-shoring, so must European states. If European states do not hold and control their own data, they remain deeply connected to the US military and industrial machine. There already exist European companies who can and would do this.

Decoupling from US dependencies and realising a sovereign capability will require the reletting of contracts; C2 systems and data holding (and storage) aould be a good place to start. There will be considerable ire from the US administration but that is not insurmountable: the continuing need to buy US produced military platforms for the coming decade will offset the US loses. Anger will be short lived. Prosperity will continue on both sides of the Atlantic. But the small serious steps towards European self-sufficiency for deterrence and defence start here.