Insubordination (or “Consent and evade”) within the command chain

Obedience – whether to a constitution, a political head of state, or simply to superior officers (in rank) – is one of the founding principles of all militaries. Breaking that tenet of obedience needs a pretty good reason: and having a better idea about how to win a battle isn’t usually included in those excuses that might dig you out of trouble. Yet, there are several cases where insubordination (disobedience) in the command chain ends is success. Senior officers are not in the habit of making these public for fear of undermining their authority and plans.

Insubordination doesn’t just get a bad press most of the time; it is feared. Creeping disobedience within militaries has become as endemic as in societies (think about the public attitude to law and order), but most of it manifests as grudging obedience, refinement (or interpretation of orders), or exiting the service. There have been concerns at senior levels that have become public: In 2021, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a memo reminding the United States military that the institution was firmly founded on the principle of subordination to a civil authority. This coming despite the then Chairman (Mark Milley) having pushed the idea of disciplined disobedience (something in the 1970s known, at least in the US Army, as selective disobedience). They were about different things however: the JCS memo related to institutional subservience to the constitution (in relation to personal practices during the COVID pandemic); the latter related to freedoms needed in combat missions and the worrying habit of micro-management by echelons, that some might claim are being perpetuated under the MDO, MDI, and JADC2 concepts of operations.

Today, if one was to mention insubordination to a commander and – depending on nationality – you will conjure up a variety of images and examples in their minds. For the US, it is Billy Mitchell or Douglas MacArthur; in the UK, Mike Jackson; in Israel, Ariel Sharon. Nate Jennings recounted Sharon’s insubordination during the counter-offensive over Suez during the Yom Kippur War in 1973 during a podcast recently.

Sharon was commanding the 143rd (Reserve) Armoured Division and had an audacious plan in his head to cross the Suez Canal and attack the Egyptian forces in the seam between their army groups. Neither of his immediate superiors approved his plan (indeed, they asked for his removal). So Sharon then went to their superior, IDF Chief of Staff David Elazar, and was again refused. Not to be put off, Sharon then went to Israeli Secretary of Defence, Moshe Dyan, and requested permission: the politician approved Sharon’s plan outside of the command chain. The result was the foundation of the success of the southern theatre and the defeat of the Soviet-backed Egyptian forces. It was one of those moments when insubordination resulted in a significant victory.

But Sharon’s case study is not the only example of this, nor is it only a feature of behaviour in armies.

One might be forgiven in thinking that this was only an issue for armies. No so. British readers might be aware that the Royal Navy’s most infamous hero, Lord Horatio Nelson, was well practice in disobeying his superiors. At both Cape St Vincent (1797), and at Copenhagen (1801), Nelson deliberately chose to disobey orders and go his own way. Both actions were successful.

In the Battle of St Vincent Nelson broke from the remainder of the British fleet to attack a second group of Spanish ships, in contravention of the plans of the commander (Admiral Jervis). The Royal Navy was out-numbered in ships by 2-to-1 at the start of the battle, but the Spanish were disorganised. Believing that Jervis would not be able to retain his chosen formation and put his fleet in a position to destroy the main enemy division of ships before the Spanish were able to flee, Nelson broke away from the main body and pushed his ship (HMS Captain) into the second Spanish division. Six Spanish warships rounded on HMS Captain but the crew was wildly successful in their gunnery, and the action almost certainly led the decisiveness of the British victory.

Nelson again proved his penchant for selective obedience during the Battle for Copenhagen in 1801. Here, the Royal Navy was to attack the Dano-Norwegian Navy in order to prevent it joining the French fleet and becoming a more significant threat to British interests. The need to defeat the Danish fleet was complicated by the shallow depth of the harbour and its approaches, as well as presence of both floating batteries and fortresses to landward. As the British plan for battle started to go awry, Admiral Parker (commanding the overall force), signalled that Nelson’s forces should withdraw. Nelson acknowledged the order but ignored it – with a humorous comment about being a bit blind (he had lost sight in an eye during the siege of Calvi in 1794) – ending the battle in a ceasefire followed by an armistice after British gunnery had neutralised much of Copenhagen’s defences.

Insubordination in battle is not just a behaviour limited to the anglosphere, however. During the German invasion of Norway in the Second World War, Birger Eriksen, commander of Oscarsborg Fortress in the Oslo fjord, spotted unknown ships steaming towards the capital of the Viking state. According to orders Eriksen should have fired warning shots and positively identified the vessels. Instead – and in a conscious act of disobedience – he ordered the artillery battery to fire on them, suspecting (as was the case) that they carried the first elements of the invasion force.

Well aimed gunnery sank the Kriegsmarine Admiral Hipper-class heavy cruiser Blucher, causing some confusion and disarray to the German invaders. This brought the vital time needed for the Norwegian government to evacuate the Oslo – accompanied by Norway’s gold reserves.

Naval insubordination is not simply a Western concept. As far back 1597 during the second Japanese invasion of Korea, Admiral Ti Sun-sin disobeyed direct orders from his King to turn the tide of the entire war.

During the first Japanese invasion (1592), Admiral Yi’s concept of naval operations had stymied the Japanese ability to resupply troops, undermining the whole war. But five years later, Japanese influence in the Korean court had banished Yi (indeed, he was not only dismissed but tortured). His successor managed to get almost the entirety of the Korean navy destroyed in a Japanese trap, gifting the invaders a freedom of action that was underwritten by the uncontested resupply by sea. The King reinstated Yi after this disaster but ordered him to abandon any thoughts of fighting the Japanese navy and instead to operate as part of the ground forces (as ‘integrated’ concept of operations?).

Yi – again consciously – disobeyed this directive and set a trap for the massed Japanese fleet, using geography and hydrography against a force that outnumbered him by a ten-to-one ratio of ships. The resulting defeat of the Japanese – caused by their own failure to understand the power of tides – forced them to retreat and allowed Yi to deny resupply of the invading force again.

In more recent events, insubordination ashore has had notable moments too. After he was appointed Commander of NATO’s Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), General Mike Jackson served in the NATO C2 chain, reporting to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, American four-star General Wesley Clark. Under Jackson’s command, the ARRC deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina in March 1999, where Jackson served his second tour of duty in the Balkans, commanding KFOR, NATO’s multi-national peacekeeping force established at the end of the Kosovo War. According to popular accounts, “He gained significant media attention in June 1999 after a confrontation with Clark in which he refused to block the runways of the Russian-occupied Pristina Airport and isolate the Russian troops there, thus preventing them from flying in reinforcements. In one heated discussion with Clark, Jackson reputedly told him “I’m not going to start the Third World War for you”. He later told the BBC he believed that obeying the order would have led to the possibility of an armed confrontation with Russian troops, which he felt was not “the right way to start off a relationship with Russians”. The point became moot when the US government prevailed upon neighbouring countries, including Hungary and Romania, to prevent Russian use of their airspace to fly in reinforcements. Jackson was criticised for his actions by American military officers and politicians, including General Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who called the incident “troubling”, and Senator John Warner, who accused Jackson of insubordination.”

Jackson’s actions are not as unusual as one might think. Heinz Guderian repeatedly disobeyed the orders of his superior officer (Ewald von Kleist) during the crossing the Meuse at Sedan in 1940. Guderian’s actions directly led to the comprehensive defeat of France during WW2. Both he and Rommel had a history of disobedience and disagreement with superior commanders. Guderian was not averse to arguing with Hitler either, although he did stop short of direct disobedience with the Fuhrer.

When one starts looking, insubordination within C2 chains has actually been rife (numerous examples exist within the US Revolutionary and Civil wars). One rule emerges: if you are going to practice disobedience, ensure that you win the engagement. The hangman’s noose awaits those who fail.