MDO misses the target

It is perplexing to continue to read about Multi-Domain-Operations; a concept so confused and bifurcated that all attempts to clarify it leave the original idea in a jumbled mess of ill-found promises and disastrous language. Even if someone explains the concept in a meaningful way that is relatable and lodged in reality (see Sean Welch on Coupling, or Nate Jennings’ 1973 Yom Kippur War analogy), one realises that the current interpretations are diverging from such frameworks at considerable pace. Indeed, within the NATO alliance there are many different interpretations of what MDO is, what it is trying to achieve*, or even – courageously** – define it as a new way of war. There is a glimmer of hope however: MDO is having zero impact on the people required to do the actual fighting, even if their precious training time is being increasingly wasted with indoctrination rather than building fighting power.

But MDO is an operational level issue!

At a recent conference on the topic, few participants could agree to a definition of MDO or the practical benefits that might be delivered from it. One point of agreement was harvested however: that MDO was an operational level concept that would enable headquarters staff to “synchronise, harmonise and orchestrate effects across battlefields.” It is a compelling vision but has little evidence to support it, nor is there a practical plan to make this ambition a reality. With the benefit of hindsight, many viewed the now-defunct concepts of Network-Enabled- Capability and Effects-Based-Operations with the same passion and zeal. One might wonder, with some justification, whether the desire to make the life of staff at echelon level easier justifies the resources being thrown at MDO across military structures? Is this the problem MDO is really seeking to solve? Is it the underlying issue that makes contemporary Western powers so inept at winning wars?

Perhaps the issue with MDO is that it misses the point. A military-only MDO doctrine will not deliver success in war. The UK and Taiwanese interpretations of MDO are – confusingly – MDI (Multi-Domain Integration). They do not mean cross military co-operation (formerly called ‘jointery’, or perhaps even ‘super-jointery’) but embrace and seek to cohere non-military government levers too. Putting aside non-military interpretations of this as a power-grab by the various ministries, the pursuit of this harmonisation seeks to deliver efficiency and effectiveness that has – until now – been the role of national security councils (see Paul O’Neill and specifically the chapter by Natia Suskuria) and national security strategies. Such an approach would certainly answer critics of the latter’s performance over recent years (see The Chilcott Report), but this was not the origin of the concept nor is it the definition being used in other NATO member states.

The disorder over MDO (either as a doctrine, a way of fighting, a way to organise, or perhaps even an efficiency measure for militaries), has been present since it emerged from the US Army (see Kelly McCoy’s account for some revealing insights). Importantly, the challenge was laid down by then DSD Bob Work in 2015 and the resulting theory developed over the subsequent 12 months (some claim it to be solely the brainchild of H.R. McMaster). It has gone on to become the US military’s basic philosophy, doggedly followed by close allies and subsequently adopted by NATO as well. Rather surprisingly, this incoherent concept has – across all that time – become regarded as received wisdom and gone relatively unchallenged. This should worry us all.

Who will challenge the doctrine?

There is another weighty issue in tackling the failings of the MDO doctrine. Given that it has become the mandated language of the US military, NATO and individual nations, internal dissent or disagreement is discouraged: “Don’t fight the white” (the provided staff answer) dominates anyone who tries to provide challenge to the clear inadequacies of the MDO creed. While those outside direct military command can provide alternative frameworks for the idea of how the West might fight, their funding and access is largely dependent on military and/or government budgets. Challenging the military on doctrine is not an activity either welcomed or funded by these bodies.

As usual, sharp minds in national security industry are also aware of the potential disaster that the singular approach of MDO leads forces into. Yet, their ability to point this out is hampered by the potential that such critiques endanger relationships with military officers, procurement offices, and alliance structures, opening a vulnerability in bids for military contracts. Thus, commercial language becomes homogenous and intimately linked to whatever the latest fad is in military taxonomy.

With few agencies willing or able to challenge doctrine, Western militaries have adopted hyperbole that promises ‘transformation’ and ‘revolution’ where the original aims were more pragmatic. An honest assessment of MDO would be far more meagre than the rhetoric pushes towards.

All this leads one to the conclusion that there is a dishonesty about the MDO doctrine – in promise, prose and practice. It cannot practically deliver the benefits senior leaders guarantee to those fighting (soldiers, sailors, aviators, and marines). The engaged force know this: After decades of similar rhetoric on everything from ‘manoeuvre’ to ‘COIN’ they also are wise enough to now largely discount the speeches and promises from military leaders. It is this breakdown in communication between the ‘sayers’ and the ‘doers’ that will become the greatest vulnerability for Western forces: When faith and trust within a military is undermined, a military force will simply wither.

What next?

Given that US concepts are already working on successors to MDO, it would be a worthy moment to wonder what will come next. The myriad of poor concepts to emerge from militaries since the 1980s forebode of another poorly articulated and ill-considered concept which will do little but sow discord and confusion across the national security communities of the West, and prevent an increase in real lethality within militaries and credibly deter adversaries. A study of history and the traditions of military science might provide something of more use in winning combat operations than tilting at the windmill of one account of modern warfare. One can only hope because MDO is a symptom, it’s not the disease.

We – all of us – must do better.

Notes:

* It is worth noting that some militaries see MDO as a medium to share situational awareness across engaged forces, and deconflict sensors, intelligence, orders, control measures, and FIRES. For this there are already off-the-shelf products that work and are in service by many NATO states.

** ”Courageous” is used here with an English political meaning. Specifically, a “brave” decision is one that would lose you votes, whereas a “courageous” one is one that would lose you an election. See, Yes Minister (BBC).

Sean Welch, Coupling on Command and Control (podcast: https://podcasts.apple.com/gb/podcast/command-and-control/id1689408449?i=1000670357181).

Nathan Jennings, “The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: Insights for Multi-Domain Operations”, in AUSA online (December 2022), and also This Means War (podcast: https://podcasts.apple.com/gb/podcast/this-means-war/id1629454648?i=1000639347120).

Paul O’Neill (ed), Securing the State and its Citizens: National Security Councils from Around the World, Bloomsbury (2022).

John Chilcott, Lawrence Freedman, Roderic Lyne, Martin Gilbert, et al. The Chilcott Report: Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Canbury Press (2016)

Kelly McCoy, “Multi-Domain Battle: An Origin Story”, in MWI online (27 October 2017).https://mwi.westpoint.edu/road-multi-domain-battle-origin-story/