Synchronisation and Mission Command

There is an unresolved tension between the ethos of mission command (delegation of command to the lowest appropriate level), and the demands of synchronisation (that requires the retention of command and control measures at higher headquarters in order to employ and orchestrate FIRES and forces efficiently).

As commanders continue to prioritise an approach to military operations governed by the Multi Domain Operations (MDO) doctrine, synchronisation has taken on greater importance than delegation. There is nothing inherently wrong with such an approach: centralising C2 at the appropriate level is necessary – indeed essential – for success. What is more perplexing is the misplaced single-mindedness in Western militaries with mission command even under these circumstances: a rhetoric that believes these aspects of military C2 (mission command and synchronisation) are mutually reinforcing. They are not: they are – to a degree – mutually exclusive concepts.

Mission command is one of a number of options for command and control of military forces; it is focused on the decentralisation of responsibility for the conduct and execution of missions to the lowest appropriate level based on trust and pursuit of the initiative in a combat engagement. The delegation of military command has long been a fundamental tool within many martial nations, historically because of an inability of commanders to communicate with deployed units, and later in the belief that the commander at a headquarters (and his staff) did not possess the best understanding of the battle; that knowledge was held by junior commanders at the forward edge of the battle. Delegation of command and control measures to those personnel was therefore vital to ensure that the right decisions were taken. The terminology can be traced back to the Napoleonic Wars and became a notable feature of Western forces until the Cold War and beyond. In an era of large armies, wide battle fronts and a lack of reliable (and timely) communication, commanders had little choice but to trust in their subordinates to conduct their actions in pursuit of the central aims of the campaign. It was true that commanders often had little real understanding of the battle during engagements across wide areas and their decisions were often perceived to be time-late and information-poor. As armoured manoeuvre warfare became the dominant form of conflict on battlefields, it became popular for senior commanders to wander the battlefield in order to gain a better appreciation for engagements. Senior commanders often separated themselves from their main HQ and established a ’tactical HQ’ that moved forward, but the Western key to success in the Cold War and early parts of the 21^st Century was based on a philosophy of delegation of the missions, tasks, objectives and execution of activities to tactical commanders as far down the chain as possible.

Since the end of the Cold War, professional military forces have shrunk in size considerably. Alongside this, the ability of forces to communicate and exchange information in real-time has improved exponentially, and the lethality of units has also increased (as has the range and array of weapons available to them). Utilising these scarce assets, and their exquisite weapons, to best effect on an adversary now requires the harnessing of multiple levers and control measures in one place; orchestrating them to deliver devastating and overwhelming impact. The sum of combined arms martial power is now far greater than the individual parts of it – but only when brought together effectively.

One of the key roles of command and control has been to orchestrate elements, functions, and activity within a military campaign in order to maximise the impact of individual actions. Since the arrival of airpower over the battlefield, and the extended range and lethality of munitions (whether fired from land, sea or air forces), the orchestration of these effects has become increasingly important. During the latter stages of the Cold War, NATO commanders witnessed a marked improvement near real-time tracking of forces and intelligence assessments, providing those commanders and their headquarters with a much better picture of the entirety of the battle. At least that was the theory: the reality during the 1980s and 1990s was that commanders still did not have sufficient real time understanding of the battle to undertake dynamic deconfliction, orchestration and synchronisation of weapons and supplies – certainly not to the level required to make the right decisions and to prevent fratricide.

As the battlespace became increasingly digitized, commanders at higher levels of command were increasingly able to access information and imagery that provided them with a more complete picture of the battlespace than their subordinates (or their predecessors). Yet even in US-led operations in Iraq in 2003, commanders felt that effective decision-making on the battlefield was better left to subordinate elements and mission command remained the underlying philosophy for operations. In Afghanistan (2002-2017), the scarcity of resources alongside experimentation with new computerised C2 systems saw commanders increasingly retain more of the command and control permissions at higher levels in order to manage the dynamic orchestration of key engagements. Fewer permissions were delegated to junior commanders and battlespace control was centralised at headquarters. As the aim became better orchestration of assets and control measures (in order to efficiently wage war), headquarters size and shape grew and functionality of the Tactical Operations Centres (TOCs) increased accordingly. Even with perfect connectivity the capacity to knit together combined arms FIRES, conduct real time battlespace co-ordination and deconfliction, and fighting the contact battle has not proved possible for junior commanders; mental capacity (especially during periods of combat) is just not good enough. Coincidentally, information has become more accessible at central nodes than at the edge; ergo, commanders and headquarters staffs can perform these functions more efficiently and effectively, leaving junior leaders more time and capacity to conduct the detailed fight.

The practices and experiences from Afghanistan fed into wider military doctrine and synchronisation ‘across domains’ became the fashionable phrase for NATO militaries.[1] This approached, embedded in the US doctrine of Multi Domain Battle (later Multi Domain Operations)[2], really took flight after 2017 following evangelical speeches from US military leaders about the opportunities afforded by new technologies to enable efficiency on the battlefield.  Allied nations and then NATO itself adopted the mantra, doctrine and philosophy of MDO and synchronisation without serious examination of the realities being faced on contemporary battlefields, or the difference between theory and reality.

Cosmetic linguistics have played a significant role in the adoption of MDO and synchronisation (ideas of precision, effects-based operations, network enabled capability, jointery, integration, et al).[3]  The theory of synchronisation leading to another promised land of perfection in military speed, targeting, wisdom, and killing power has been evangelised by both industrialists and senior military leaders. And that theory stacks up well. What is less convincing is how well it works in practice.

Synchronisation – indeed, the idea of centralised command and control – is reliant on near perfect connectivity across the force. Where that breaks down, dynamic control of the battlespace once more needs to revert to more procedural measures. The alternative is a risk appetite for fratricide and collateral damage only really attractive to autocracies. It is certainly possible to retain this on modern battlefields: in Gaza, the Israeli Defence Force retains a high degree of situational awareness at echelon, but that has not stopped key errors from being made.[4] In contrast, the experience of Ukraine in a denied electro-magnetic environment means that synchronisation is not possible in the way envisaged by both Western manoeuvre doctrine and associated military theory.

But it is not simply the competitiveness of the EM spectrum that determines the utility and ability of synchronisation to turn a battle. In Yemen, US led operations against the Houthi’s in 2024 have had little success despite a generational disparity in ISTAR capability, perfect force connectivity, and undisputed access to the battlefield. With more than 450 attacks conducted, the Yemeni based rebel group have continued their military operations against maritime targets and those in Israeli over 2,500km away.[5] No matter the levels of intent, connectivity, command and control superiority, even martial hardware and intelligence in close proximity to the battlefield, sometimes a doctrine of MDO and synhcronisation just can’t deliver the desired results.

Mutually Exclusive Concepts

Where mission command requires the delegation of command and control measures to the lowest appropriate level, synchronisation requires the centralisation of control measures to a much higher level of command. Increasing connectivity and fidelity of sensors allows commanders to understand the battlefield better from a distance; no longer does the front-line commander have the best situational awareness.  Against this is the reality of electro-magnetically denied environments that mean even sophisticated militaries with cutting-edge communications systems have been forced to revert to pencil and paper, runners and bicycles. This conundrum between the reality of fighting versus the aspirations of doctrine, speeches, and military tactics remains unresolved.

The Western failure to deliver success on the battlefield is not simply an issue with C2, mission command, nor of an ambition to be able to synchronise everything across the battlespace; these are symptoms of a lack of imagination in our military thinking and a misunderstanding of the basic elements of military theory. Synchronisation is not a panacea, nor is mission command. Slavish adherence to either polarity of C2 has not served an adaptable military force well. Instead, there is a need for an appreciation that “cuts our shoes to fit our feet” in command and control terms.[6] Western militaries need to be less tied to fixed structures and more adaptable (in C2 terms) to the fight they find themselves in. A more delegated C2 structure may suit a highly dynamic manoeuvre battle in one war (for example, where connectivity is contested or denied), but not the next battle (where the opportunities for exploitation by manoeuvre require the allocation, orchestration and employment of scarce assets to be weighed against wider campaign objectives). The same is true for positional warfare fights: detailed control might be required in one engagement (where passage of lines or a fighting retreat requires much greater control of moving parts only available at higher levels of C2), whilst more delegation might be suitable at a different point during the same battle. It is this flexibility of mindset and approach that will add value to the C2 discussion.

Mission command and synchronisation do have opposing polarities: they rarely work well together (indeed, their very design makes them poor bedfellows). Rather than thinking about them in these rather fixed terms, we might be better to revert to conversations about detailed and delegated command and control. And to think a little more about control measures within the wider C2 discussion.

Further reading: Eric M. Walters, “Synchronization: The US Inheritance of Soviet Military Doctrine,” Marine Corps Gazette, August 1994, pp. 23-26.

[1] Phil Clare, “The Answer is Multi Domain Operations – Now What’s the Question?”, in WavellRoom, 13 February 2020. https://wavellroom.com/2020/02/13/the-answer-is-multi-domain-operations-now-whats-the-question/

[2] Sometimes MDO is referred to as Multi Domain Integration: these are different concepts across NATO allied nations and should not be considered to be interchangeable concepts. See, for example, Davis Ellison and Tim Sweijs, “Empty Promises? A Year Inside the World of Multi-Domain Operations”, in WarOnTheRocks, 22 January 2024.

[3] Elena Wicker, “Full-spectrum integrated lethality? On the promise of peril and buzzwords”, in WarOnTheRocks, 17 May 2023. https://warontherocks.com/2023/05/full-spectrum-integrated-lethality-on-the-promise-and-peril-of-buzzwords/

[4] Amina Kator-Mubarez and Chad Machiela, “MINIMIZING COLLATERAL DAMAGE WITH THE SURGICAL APPLICATION OF FORCE: APPLYING LESSONS FROM THE POST-9/11 WARS TO ISRAEL’S WAR AGAINST HAMAS”, 15 July 2024. https://mwi.westpoint.edu/minimizing-collateral-damage-with-the-surgical-application-of-force-applying-lessons-from-the-post-9-11-wars-to-israels-war-against-hamas/

[5] Gordon Lubold, “How an Iranian-Backed Militia Ties Down US Naval Forces in the Red Sea”, Washington Post, 12 June 2024. https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/how-an-iranian-backed-militia-ties-down-u-s-naval-forces-in-the-red-sea-3821056c?st=qtl7chhvh48m80g

[6] Amos Fox, “Cutting our shoes to fit the shoes”, in Military Review, Jan-Feb 2017. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2017/ART-009/