C2 for Deterrence?

There is a collection of people inside the national security community who believe that C2 for deterrence needs to be different from C2 for war fighting; with different systems, headquarters, processes, and people involved. Their view is that deterrence requires different activity from war fighting, and that command will need to be different too. It is interesting that throughout the long history of warfare (certainly since Sparta was fighting with Athens), few of our ancestors considered this necessary or sensible.

Scholarly thinking has always considered that a fundamental part of credible deterrence is the latent threat of a force able and capable of fighting an adversary to an unacceptable outcome; provided that such a force is potent enough to inflict wounds against an adversary that they consider the risk of defeat (or the cost of victory) too heavy, then deterrence is achieved. There is considerable evidence from both those wishing to deter and those being deterred that such factors do weigh heavily in the minds of decision-makers on both sides.

That is not to say that a military threat alone is the arbiter for a decision-maker, nor that martial power alone is the only way deterrence can be achieved but historical precedents are weighty. It is conventional wisdom with a compelling base of evidence. A core part of the deterrence concept is that the functions, organisation, training and preparations of the military force doing the deterring has its credibility vested in an ability to swing into action at the time and place of an adversary’s attack, removing the element of surprise, and stealing the initiative from the attacker. The command and control processes associated with that military force are those that are needed in wartime. There should be no ‘transitional state’ that requires a switching between a peacetime and wartime footing. At least not if deterrence is to be maximised, potent, and credible in the eyes of the party to be deterred.

However, the community who believe that C2 for deterrence is a ‘different thing’ consider that C2 for deterrence requires alternative types of nuance, subtlety, and elegance that is opposed to the blunt shapes and tools in which ‘C2 for warfighting’ is supposed to resemble (at least in their eyes). It is hard to understand why the idea that C2 in combat and conflict cannot have those more sophisticated facets associated with it? Indeed, one might argue that the greatest commanders – and their associated successes – have illustrated a poise, style, refinement, and ingenuity that is present but not exposed during peacetime, or even in transitions to war.

The second reason some claim they need a different C2 structure for deterrence is the claim their argument that hybrid war requires different structures, partnership, and co-operation from war fighting. Again, this seems a rather peculiar argument: perhaps relying on experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan as their sole source of reference – where armies deliberately separated fighting and nation-building tasks. Yet a core failure in both campaigns was the intellectual distance placed between platoon houses and reconstruction teams.

In the execution of contemporary wars and combat operations, belligerents of every variety are required to partner, co-operate, liaise with, engage with, and co-exist alongside the widest variety of other actors. Experiences in Ukraine, or in Israel, Syria, Nigeria, Sudan, Yemen or Iran all require C2 structures that can cross civil-military boundaries, levels of governance, and organisations in a most sophisticated – perhaps even complex – way. The idea that a national (or NATO) response to Russian drone attacks on infrastructure do not require same level of cross-organisation co-operation as those that attempt to deter Russian arson attacks on energy infrastructure is somewhat perplexing.

Yet it is also clear that in highlighting this argument, the proponents of a different C2 structure for deterrence are identifying an important critique: the current C2 structures of the military (both nationally and inside the Alliance) are too military orientated, including at the political level. The post-Cold War peace dividend has imbued in national security leaders (particularly in military chiefs) an exceptionalism that has isolated them from both defence industry, the wider political class, and the society they serve. Professional military officers often see themselves as superior to those they serve (the argument for this holds its roots in Samuel Huntington’s civilian objective control model,[1] and is perhaps best illustrated by General Stanley McCrystal’s approach to his President (Barak Obama) during his time in command of ISAF in Afghanistan).

This specialisation of military activity away from people, institutions, organisations, and societies is reflected in not only the way they have been executing fighting functions, but also in the way they have become used to commanding. The absolute power of military commanders over subordinates has become an article of faith but does not work when engaging with those outside of the military command chain who are also present – indeed, who are often more prevalent – on the battlefields. The C2 structures and organisations of Western military machines view these other actors as interfering in their route to victory, not an essential part of it. The contrast to the make-up and execution of C2 during successfulmajor combat operations could not be starker; examples abound of the integration of other parties into military HQs during successful combat operations (see, for example General Eisenhower’s HQ during the latter stages of World War II).

Today, NATO HQs are predominantly military, doing military things, with military personnel and equipment. This is not what lessons from conflict tells us is successful. The more civilians are integrated in HQs – and the more diverse the knowledge of the collective therein – the more likely the force is to achieve success in a campaign: whether for deterrence or war fighting. These are not different types of headquarters, but they are different from the military C2 systems that exist across states and the NATO Command Structure today.

[1] Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap, 1957). See also, the excellent response of Kori Schake in The Stea and The Soldier (Polity, 2025).