C2 in MDO – How far we have come… or have we?

Some may marvel at how far command and control has evolved since the 1980s, when the USMC introduced the concept of ‘control’ into the command lexicon, and when Europeans started to embrace the ideas of mission command, C2 in the manoeuvre space, counter-C2 warfare, and how technology would impact conventional conflict (manifest through the AirLand battle doctrine).

Those who wore a Western military uniform in the 1980s will recall that C2 was really performed at a unit level whilst planning was undertaken at higher levels. Orders were almost exclusively passed through a national chain at the tactical and operational level, usually from immediate superiors (since states operated in national formations sized at the divisional level, often larger). Command at sea was executed in a more multi-national environment but given the assumption of a contested – usually denied – electro-magnetic (EM) spectrum, orders were broad in nature. In the air, a similar dynamic existed, albeit that flights of aircraft operated nationally, knitted together with alliance partners for the purposes of resourcing complex missions. Generally, NATO operated on a national basis at the tactical and operational level, guided by Alliance strategy and policy. Control measures – even before they were classified as such – were procedural; a function of both the EM spectrum; the belief that being undetected had greater value than being in-touch with a wider array of friendly forces; and the limits of technological capability. Generic deconfliction measures served equal purpose to friends and adversaries (on the one hand to prevent fratricide and on the other to be efficient in attacking adversaries).

Underpinning all military operations at the end of the Cold War was the concept of mission command. Just as it had been for Napoleon or Wellington, commanders understood that only those fighting at the front understood the progress of each battle: commanders therefore deployed forward with their fighting forces, leaving planning – along with other functions – to their headquarters staff in the rear. The nature of connectivity and communications (and the battlespace) in the 1980s left commanders with no alternative but to trust their subordinates to act in the best interests of the mission – often without understanding the entirety of the campaign. This was as true at sea or in the air as it was in the land environment: ships would deploy on missions and not expect updates from higher commanders more frequently that every 24hours, more often much longer. Subordinate commanders were expected to execute their missions as best they could, adapting their own plans to the environment, the dynmics of each situation, weather, oceanography, threats, and damage.

As an exception to contemporary norms of military operations – where constant connectivity is presumed – submarines still execute missions with a 1980s methodology today (to a certain extent). The vast majority of forces, however, are now programmed to operate with near constant oversight, orders, connectivity, and support from C2 functions at higher levels. Individual commands sit under the eagle eye of several tiers of commanders in rear headquarters who have the opportunity to understand the entirety of a campaign as it develops in a way their predecessors have not. The doctrine of Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) is the chosen methodology across NATO (and member states) to exploit this new connected force. It is popular with commanders and headquarters staff who can often be found evangelising about the ‘transformation’ it will bring. Certainly, for them new information flows, data streams, and AI decision-support will likely bring them fresh insights into battles and campaigns. It will allow them to ‘manage’ battlespace in a way hitherto only found in pulp-fiction war novels. It should minimise potential fratricide and maximise the effectiveness of their forces in any action against an adversary.

Conversely, those below echelon are more wary – resistant even – of a C2 singularity driving their detailed activity from afar. Those concerns are captured smartly in new book (MDO: The Pursuit of Battlefield Dominance for the 21^STCentury), by Amos Fox and Franz-Stefan Gady which points out, “The authorities to employ weapons and high-end systems may never be delegated to lower-level commanders. These commanders may not have the requisite skills to effectively command and employ assets that cross domains, and thus not be able to take the initiative in a meaningful manner.” Despite such reservations about the efficacy of MDO as a concept expressed by globally expert authors in that book, these issues will not halt the blind pursuit of MDO (at the expense of everything else). MDO might well spell the end for mission command as the overarching philosophy for Western C2 – but that might not be a bad thing either.

C2 in MDO is dependent on connectivity that generates an-all seeing, all-understanding commander who can deliver battlefield dominance for contemporary warfare. Yet MDO is not fit for purpose, neither is the C2 upon which it relies. MDO is a one-size fits all doctrine; it has no appreciation or acknowledgement of the different operating models of adversaries. It has no theory of success, surprise, victory, or failure. MDO offers no solutions to contextual challenges posed by equipment, heuristics, machine biases, coding errors, or to the actions of adversaries. Indeed, MDO is entirely ignorant of the actions of others, and has a homogenous view of enemies, alongside assumptions of single logic paths and rationality models that are not far from mythical. Yet there is also evidence that mission command is not suitable for every circumstance: other models do exist and have been employed most effectively.

Leaving aside the issues this raises for forces attempting to understand their place within the MDO doctrine, and the fallacies the concept contains in presuming actions by adversaries, the implications for C2 are considerable. While commanders are now exposed to data and detail about the battlespace, this is not delivering the certainty that those same commanders believe it does. The challenges are not simply about data veracity, programme bias, AI hallucinations, or system logic bridging, but – according to the Ukrainian experience in fighting the Russian invasion – determined by the lack of connectivity determined by the EM spectrum operations conducted by both belligerents.

Perfect connectivity – the prerequisite for MDO and the C2 systems that underpin it – is not assured in contemporary campaigns. Planning for that – without a back-up plan – is foolhardy.

MDO: The Pursuit of Battlefield Dominance in the 21^st Century, edited by Amos Fox and Franz-Stefan Gady is available from Howgate Publishing. The volume pulls together a group of renowned global national security scholars and practitioners to examine almost every part of the MDO concept. The theory of MDO is decimated under forensic analysis. This book is important – one of the few that challenges today’s military dogma – and because of that Western military hierarchies are likely to chafe at and resist the conclusions found inside.