US and Allies: Time runs out for Managed Decoupling

Russian wars and revanchism are the public narrative relating to increasing defence spending in European states but few doubt that national security spending is actually being determined by the actions of US President Donald J. Trump. As part of that dynamic, many leaders in Europe’s capitals have been pragmatic: they understand that building a set of defensive capabilities independent from US influence, control, and technology will take a decade to achieve a credible minimum. As a result, for the remainder of DJT’s presidency and into the following one (which seems likely led by JD Vance), Europeans will need to pander to the American leadership. Placating, praising, appeasing, and mollifying the leadership in Washington DC for another eight years will not be popular domestically for European statesmen but there is no alternative: a messy divorce would leave all of Europe’s national security systems (outside, perhaps, Poland and Finland) in pieces – certainly ineffective against a much inferior Russian force.

Thus, behind the closed doors of Europe’s capitals, the mantra has been for a ‘managed decoupling’ from the United States. Weening itself off the dependencies on US ideas, goods, services, and guarantees was being planned as a staged break-up: US military equipment and systems would still be purchased but in smaller numbers than before. Rebuilding European defence industry had become a priority – albeit delivered in a careful, considered and coherent way. Provided a US military presence could be maintained Europe could take a decade to build its own security umbrella.

The planned decoupling required European leaders to continue to deploy forces, act diplomatically, and cut economic deals that favoured the US, American interests, and the US defence industry complex. There was a belief that provided the financial reward for the US economy was clear, America could be persuaded to remain engaged in European security in the near term. As if sensing this, US uniformed staff had started to become more strident in their demands that European militaries buy American systems (the pitches for some projects now sound more like ultimatums).

Whilst perceived by many as having moved European militaries from positions as junior partners to one of complete subservience to US demands, there has been little choice for Europeans seeking to rebuild their own defence capabilities given an understanding of the realities associated with recapitalising the continent’s defence industrial base. It was a pragmatic approach that seemed rational and logical but also avoided a panic of decision-making and ill-considered contract awards.

This managed decoupling has fallen foul of President Trump’s new-found confidence in his use of the US military. In comparison to somewhat strained relations during his first term, President Trump feels he has successfully employed US hard power in Nigeria, Syria, Yemen, Iran, and Venezuela. With a taste for victory on his terms and a confidence in his ability to wield unrestrained executive power, there is little slowing his growing enthusiasm for ‘progress’ in delivering the change – the mandate he was elected on.

American ambitions to annex Greenland have not been slowed by Congress. Why? President Trump may be explaining what comes across as imperialist tendencies in terms of national security against ballistic missile threats to ‘his’ hemisphere, but the other reasons pertain to the mineral deposits lying in that landmass. China owns mining and extraction rights to around 60% of the earth’s rare earth minerals, and 90% of the processing capacity that is required to refine it. Greenland – like Australia – has yet to be brought or claimed by Beijing. If President Trump can secure these – through ownership not a bidding war – the United States will reduce dependencies from China (a key facet of the 2026 national security strategy). The US Congress is all too aware of this reality and can see the rationel behind it. They may not like the way their President is going about hemispheric autarky but the long-term benefits to achieving it would be undeniable.

For Europe, this is a critical decision-point in the plan for managed decoupling. To submit to US demands over sovereignty is – in essence – to swear fealty to the US in all matters. To deny President Trump’s demands will unpick the fabric of European security. Time is the one variable that Europe considered it could control in the break-up with America. It no longer has that luxury.

Many in Europe are now watching events in Toronto with interest. Prime Minister Mark Carney’s recent realignment with China as preferred partner over the US has placed another option on the table that few believed could exist. Carney, a respected economist and statesman in European capitals, has clearly considered where global power will lie, what measures will help his country most over the coming century, and who is a more reliable and predictable ally. It is also likely that Canada’s national security apparatus has determined that CCP Premier Xi Xing Ping has more leverage over Russian President Putin than President Trump has. In mitigating the threat in the Arctic from Russia, Mark Carney might well believe that a new strategic relationship with China provides greater security for Canada than the historic partnership with the United States. Other heads of European states will now be wondering whether the price of partnering with China is worth it.

President Trump’s Greenland gambit might be similar to President Putin’s invasion of Ukraine (cf the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO). The unintended consequences of a recast US posture on national security are shifting the political winds on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. There will be outcomes distinctly unfavourable to the United States well beyond tit-for-tat tariffs, but that will not stop the tide from turning.

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