EPIC FURY: How much is C2 being transformed?

The US war against Iran is likely to be an example of contemporary conflict that will be examined endlessly. Command and Control (c2) is one facet that will be subject to detailed analysis. Are the lessons from that campaign more important than those we have seen emerge from Russia’s war against Ukraine?

Many of the observations being made and lessons drawn from the 38-day combat campaign in the Middle East are different to those in Ukraine, as was the context. Operation Epic Fury set a world uber power (in military terms) against a nation state that was not a near-peer. Not even close. By contrast, in 2022 Ukraine was a near-peer of Russia in quality (but not quantity), and now – after four years of war – looks and feels like a peer adversary. Certainly, it is hard to think of a more battle hardened, technologically competent, resource aware national security team than is found in Kiev. Russia has evolved too. Command and control has also been different: C2 in both Ukraine and Russia have evolved over a period of intense conflict and a rediscovery of counter-C2 warfare; Iran’s distributed C2 networks, like those of Hamas and Hezbollah, did not survive the intense assaults of day one. American C2 has emerged as largely autonomous, embracing the technologies pioneered by the IDF after their operations in Gaza between 2023 and 2025. Yet none of the belligerents in either of these two wars have found decisive strategic or political success. That does not mean that there are not interesting observations to be made. Selected here are four issues that relate to C2: The behaviours of allies and partners; Targeting and technology; Weapon allocation, use, and stockpiles; and Pol/Mil C2.

Kiev survived the early 2022 onslaught from Russia alone. Allies, some who came quickly others less so, provided political legitimacy, a sense of righteousness, and money. They also offered advice of dubious utility, and no small measure of hubris. As supporters for Ukraine multiplied, so did the delivery of money, training, arms, weapons, intelligence and other select resources. Kiev never allowed itself to become a bystander in discussions over support, but neither were leaders oblivious to the ambitions and aspirations of their partners. Ukraine has not had the opportunity to draw its allies into actual fighting unlike Russia whose use of foreign troops has cost the regime in Moscow much in terms of unique intellectual property. In supplying soldiers (and supplies) for Russia, North Korea has not sought an active role in strategy, planning, or command and has been content to play along under Russian military and political leadership. Interestingly, Israel has not played the supplicant role that US Allies have traditionally opted for since the end of the Cold War. Israel had an agenda for Operation Epic Fury and has ensured that those objectives sat at the heart of US actions and strategy. Instead of acting as a dutiful junior partner, the IDF had their own agenda and fulfilled it masterfully. The US military managed the differences in political strategic aims well, exploiting the IDF’s more flexible boundaries for action with their own aims and objectives in a concerted, orchestrated and synchronised manner. How much control the US commanders had over IDF actions is a subject of some debate but, externally at least, the military coherence appeared rock-solid. One might observe from both conflicts that being able to manage allies and partners in war is not a skill that requires decades of practice, endless compromise, and large, well-connected, permanent headquarters; the evidence tells us that it is not a skill unique to Western states or cultures.

The targeting cycle for US and IDF operations against Iran was delivered by the US MAVEN C2 system: consider it a derivative of the IDF’s ‘Lavender’ and ‘Where’s Daddy?’ systems, including the myriads of controversial issues embedded within the base algorithms. The targets that the system recommended (almost exclusively developed and recommended by AI) came thick and fast. According to the US Department of Defense (or department of war depending on your interpretation of who can rename US federal institutions), over 13,000 targets were hit during 38 days of combat operations. This included around 2,000 command and control targets. Reporting indicates that few of these targets required a human input, other than the return key. As has been raised by a myriad of journalists, ethicists, philosophers, technologists, human rights groups, international organisations, foreign governments, independent bodies, and international lawyers, the lack of friction, debate, argument, dissention, and human discussion over targets and targeting is an area that weakens the public perception of the military and national security communities. It also has as many flaws, if not more than, as a human has and makes as many errors – just faster. The lack of human agency in decision-making in Epic Fury is a new facet of military operations: for millennia, the centrality of human agency in decision-making has been an accepted safeguard on the behaviour of combatants. For the US military, this human agency has been discarded in favour of speed. In Ukraine, the adoption of autonomous ground, sea and air combat vehicles – using their own AI to make decisions on engagements – has also been evident. Western militaries are rushing to replicate such an approach. Yet the efficacy and effectiveness of this approach have little evidence to support a wholesale rejection of human decision-making as a part of warfare. Indeed, Ukraine’s forces remain convinced about the role of humans in their war: Kiev still regards tanks, warships, fighters and bombers as central to credible warfighting forces. And that the role of humans in Ukrainian military decision-making remains important, unique, and fundamental. The path of AI in warfare is becoming less homogenous: supporting humans (the Ukrainian approach), or supported by humans (the US and Israeli approaches). The dangers of AI adoption in military decision-making remain largely absent from discussion in other Western states.

The third point about Epic Fury, and clearly evident in Ukraine for more than a few years, is the weapon usage rate of combat operations. It is a recurring theme of all wars that weapon use, and ammunition requirements always exceed peacetime accountancy assumptions. The impacts for deterrence, operations, and ways of fighting are significant. When US and Israeli forces strike 13,000 targets, that is 13,000 weapons that are no longer available for use elsewhere. And in rebuilding stockpiles, those who have ordered from US companies will now have to wait until the US military sees their stockpiles as replenished sufficiently before overseas orders are fulfilled. Given that the timeline to produce complex weapons is measured in months rather than days, those Western governments who signed contracts since 2023 for Patriot missiles, NASAMs, and HIMARs have already been told of delays for delivery. One suspects this will be a matter of years not months. This certainly impacts on the deterrence status of many states (from Japan to Poland), but it will also impact on commanders and the way militaries can fight in future. Target selection will need to be more exacting; priorities will have to become more centralised to ensure the correct apportionment of scarce sophisticated weapons, and dynamic targets are less likely to be ‘serviced’. It also means that what can be defended (from air attack) will also need to be more selective. Less air defence means less geographic protection, but also less capacity to absorb attacks. Fewer defensive systems and missiles mean more attacks will be successful and damage to infrastructure will move from likely to certain (in the face of a determined attack). A restriction on the availability of weapons will also impact on the duration of combat operations: fewer missiles mean less time to achieve Western ends before suing for peace becomes necessary. This will impact on how commanders will have to make decisions, and what sort of combat Western states will be willing to be drawn into. When opponents are not under the same restrictions (Russia, for example, has adapted its economy for war over a four year period and is out producing the West in missiles, ammunition and armaments by a very significant margin), and are aware of the depletion of Western stockpiles, the decision to take military action becomes more likely; the assumption being that the enemy will run out of arms and therefore cannot act or react. Knowing that Western powers cannot fight for more than a week will make strategic gains more deliverable by military force. Thus, while Western commanders may seek a quick and decisive war, that is not – perhaps – the approach that adversaries will offer. It seems less likely now than hitherto that Europeans will be able to fight in the way they envisage and are planning for.

Finally, there are elements of political military command and control that are worth raising here. In both combat theatres (Ukraine and Iran), combat forces have delivered what they have been able to. For Epic Fury, neither the US nor Israel have found the end result that they wanted. Israel may have secured a further 5 years of managed peace with Iran (due to their lack of capabilities rather than curbed intent), but beyond that a new generation of passionate anti-Israel martyrs has been born. Neither has Israel cemented friends in the West. For the US, President Trump has found Iran a more difficult conundrum to solve than Venezuela was. The US may have ‘mowed the grass’ (again) of Iran’s nuclear capability, destroyed much of Iran’s conventional military, and killed Iran’s leaders, but the regime remains in control and has vowed to continue fighting (by unconventional means – always Iran’s strongest suit). The US position domestically and internationally had been – according to some commentators – dramatically weakened (“Trump Humbled by Iran”). Equally though, neither Kiev nor Moscow have achieved their desired goals – militarily or politically. The absence of success in military operations should not be a surprise. It is hard to find examples where the use of force alone has resulted in a better outcome than was imagined at the start of the campaign. It is not suggested that militaries are ignorant of this evidence, rather that political leaders (and advisors) are naive in their belief in the omnipotence of military power alone and what can be achieved. It is, however, incumbent on military leaders to do better at explaining the costs, impacts, and potential outcomes of military action: their ability to debate, explain, and describe likely outcomes can only be honed through greater vigour and rigour during period of professional military education.

There are very few reputable national security commentators who do not acknowledge that command and control in modern wars is changing. The more excitable ones outline a transformation or revolution that is in various states of revelation. More sober analysis from the doyens is more reserved: that C2 is changing is not disputed but whether the varying trajectories serve soldiers, leaders, and societies better is less clear. The four areas highlighted above – allies and partners, targeting and technology, weapon stocks, and Pol-Mil C2 efficacy – are useful areas for illumination. They indicate the realities for militaries of C2 in modern combat while pointing to vastly different ways of fighting that will be required in the future, and for which C2, at every level, will continue to hold the responsibility for delivering.