Commercialisation of warfare does not mitigate risks to societies

As the commercialisation of national security activities continues unabated, the risks from attack may have shifted to contractors but societies hold the ultimate costs. Perhaps outsourcing security to industry is less effective than peacetime experience (and assumptions) indicates.

There is a long and august history of commercial actors fulfilling the needs and roles of societies in the provision of national security. Historically, the use of, for example, privateers were attractive to national leaders when the costs of immediate security needs could not be met by standing militaries. There were also notable moments were it was preferable to authorise contractors to conduct security activities for the state when the risks (to life) during those operations was deemed too high for military forces flagged to that state.

More recently, Western forces started getting serious about commercial contractors in hard to access places. In Somalia, the US military used contractors to provide logistics and life support in austere bases under long term agreements. In Iraq, the use of Private Military Companies rose – not simply in providing combat service support activities but in providing physical security too. The pattern of PMC activity, as well as logistics support, was high during Allied missions in Afghanistan but it has also been evident across Africa and Europe. Russia, China, Iran, and others have been ‘fast-followers’ in their understanding and use of PMCs for security, logistics support, and more. Famously, Russia’s Wagner Group of mercenaries provided combat power both in Ukraine and across sub-Saharan Africa in providing a national security lever for Moscow at arm’s length. Wagners actions may not have been plausibly deniable or distinct from Russian foreign policy goals, but the delivery of combat power (and Russian influence in Africa) allowed Russia to maintain the bulk of its military on European tasks rather than necessitating a split focus.

There has been an attractiveness in the use of PMCs, initially on cost grounds but which has expanded considerably. The financial cost benefits are not easily discounted – particularly to states that have little interest in building, maintaining or retaining sovereign combat power. Were specialist and costly equipment is needed for a specific mission, the purchase of platforms (high cost, specialised, and capital-intensive capabilities that then require both people and maintenance for operations) could be viewed as an unnecessary expense. Additionally, those platforms require support, maintenance, basing, and people to operate then (and provide security for them) well after the mission is completed. Such continuing expense was deemed unaffordable to much of the equipment nations purchased for operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns.

Those on-going costs are accentuated where the use of the skills for combat operations, and specialist knowledge of the region (and the adversary), is not deemed a continuing requirement by political and military leaders. At points over the last 50 years, Western chiefs have been quick to sack Russia experts, but also those that retained skills (language, interpersonal, and cultural) relevant to the Middle East. It was deemed to be cheaper to contract out for such specialist knowledge when needed rather than have to pay for the on-going costs when such expertise was not deemed necessary. The same reasoning goes for capital platforms. Why should taxpayers foot the bill for large sustainment ships, for example, when they can be leased or provided on a contract-for-availability basis?

To accountants (which seems to include most military officers servicing in ministries of state today), there appear to be few downsides. Yet, the real issue is not about the costs: resources, people, skills, expertise, capitation rates. In peacetime, any issues and problems appear to be rather contractual rather than real. Indeed, during prewar periods the main questions to be addressed are about the business continuity plans of providers. How would they survive a fire or natural disaster of their main facilities? Who takes over if essential technical staff take alternate job offers? These are the conundrums that MoD contracts seek to address.

It is annoying, then, when other issues arise. What if—after being attacked by a foreign state—the commercial provider simply takes the insurance money, accepts the fine for contractual liability (after a lengthy court case), and walks away, or sets up in another country? Where does that leave the society that the contract was meant to support? This need not simply be an attack. Such circumstances could be caused by unfriendly tax regimes, changing legal requirements, or a political environment that the company feels makes the work no longer viable. Contracts might well deliver what is written, but the only way of holding-to-account will be financial penalties; something that companies can insure against. There is no social contract between the public and the company in the same way that exists between society and its own military.

Currently, there seem few who are concerned about the level of risk being transferred to private industry; the demand for fiscal efficiency is outweighing any considerations about resilience, reliability, or accountability. This is only likely to get more difficult as the services governments are contracting out become entwinned more deeply into national security, making contracted capabilities and activities the subject of enemy action as legitimate targets.[1] If and when commercial platforms start to be targeted and attacked, military forces will be required for their protection – a cost and resource that state militaries have not accounted for. There is also every possibility that shareholders of the companies involved may wish to exit the contract rather than face such risks.

On this issue, the core question becomes: What insurance do societies have for the commercialisation of warfare? At present, the answer is ‘absolutely none’.

[1] In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. Gaby Rado, “Legitimate Military Targets”, Crimes of War Project (2001).

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